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Abstract – The electoral cycle literature has developed 
in two clearly distinct phases. The first one considered 
the existence of non-rational (naive) voters whereas 
the second one considered fully rational voters. It is 
our view that an intermediate approach is more 
appropriate, i.e. one that considers learning voters, 
which are boundedly rational. In this sense, one may 
consider perceptrons as learning mechanisms used by 
voters to perform a classification of the incumbent in 
order to distinguish opportunistic (electorally 
motivated) from benevolent (non-electorally 
motivated) behaviour of the government. The paper 
explores precisely the problem of how to classify a 
government showing in which, if so, circumstances a 
perceptron can resolve that problem. This is done by 
considering a model recently considered in the 
literature, i.e. one allowing for output persistence, 
which is a feature of aggregate supply that, indeed, 
may turn impossible to correctly classify the 
government. 
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1. Introduction 
An electoral cycle created by governments is a 
phenomenon that seems to characterise, at least in 
some particular occasions and/or circumstances, the 
democratic economies. As it is generally accepted, 
the short-run electorally-induced fluctuations 
prejudice the long-run welfare. Since the very first 
studies on the matter, some authors offered 
suggestions as to what should be done against this 
electorally-induced instability. For some authors, 
ever since the seminal paper of Nordhaus (1975), a 
good alternative to the obvious proposal to increase 
the electoral period length is to consider that voters 
abandon a passive and naive behaviour and, instead, 
are willing to learn about government’s intentions. 
The electoral cycle literature has developed in two 
clearly distinct phases. The first one, which took 
place in the mid-1970s, considered the existence of 
non-rational (naive) voters. In accordance with the 
rational expectations revolution, in the late 1980s 
the second phase of models considered fully 
rational voters. It is our view that an intermediate 
approach is more appropriate, i.e. one that 
considers learning voters, which are boundedly 
rational. In this sense, one may consider 
perceptrons as learning mechanisms used by voters 
to perform a classification of the incumbent in 
order to distinguish opportunistic (electorally 
motivated) from benevolent (non-electorally 
motivated) behaviour of the government. The main 
objective of this paper consists precisely on 
studying the problem of how to classify a 
government showing in which, if so, circumstances 
a perceptron, can resolve that problem. To achieve 
this objective we will consider a recent version of a 
stylised model of economic policy, i.e. a version 
based on an aggregate supply curve embodying 
output persistence. See Gärtner 
(1996,1997,1999,2000) and/or Caleiro (2009,2012). 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. 
Section 2 offers the analysis of the bounded 
rationality approach as a motivation for the use of 
perceptrons as learning devices. Section 3 then 
presents the characteristics of the perceptron, which 
will be used to perform the classification of the 
government task. Section 4 explores the problem of 
how to classify a government showing in which, if 
so, circumstances the perceptron can resolve that 
problem. Section 5 concludes. 
2. The Bounded Rationality 
Approach 
Generally speaking, learning models have been 
developed as a reasonable alternative to the 
unrealistic informational assumption of rational 
expectations models. Moreover, through learning 
models it is possible to study the dynamics of 
adjustment between equilibria which, in most 
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